Notices to Stakeholders

The EU has been patiently spelling out the consequences of the choice made by the 52% for the UK to leave the EU. They have been doing this in a sector by sector way, with short readable documents pointing at the changes that must happen if we are no longer to be a member state. There are 68 such documents so far. I will maintain this list and add new ones to the top, it isn’t in any overall specific order.

They are all available on the EU website in the list of preparedness documentsand they crop up elsewhere on sector relevant pages, such as the one where it is pointed out that a bunch of things we export now will require an import license after Brexit.

As the EU website is a bit slow and opening many PDF files is a bit of a pain, I have done a super short summary for each, detailing who is screwed, and how badly I think they are screwed on a scale of 😃 😐 😟 or in some cases 💩. For some, like the one on trade marks we will be falling out of EU regulation but we don’t fall far because we land on various international protections. It is objectively worse, but we will get over it, it is fine 😃. For the one relating to medicines approval, people will die as a result, so that gets a 💩. Isn’t Brexit a laugh.

I have very probably misunderstood quite a few of these and made errors, let me know in the comments and I will correct them. I am just one regular guy, and a lot of these are well outside my comfort zone, but no professional journalists seem to have made an effort to examine them en mass so someone had to.

  • Maritime and Aviation Safety
    If you are on a connecting flight in the EU — perhaps going via Charles de Gaul or Schipol then you and your bags are going to be unloaded and re-scanned to EU standards. This appears to be rather pointless as we do security to a high standard and they point out several times that this can be fixed by the stroke of a commission pen: “This would no longer apply should the United Kingdom at one point be listed in attachment 3-B of the Annex to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1998.” This appears to be something that will be resolved quite simply if we settle our financial commitments.
    On the Maritime security, scheduled ferries to France, Ireland and the Netherlands will no longer be exempt from declaring security information on entering ports, they have to do the same as an unscheduled cruise ship would do. The security information can only be done by an EU27 national, so that might be annoying. This gets a 😐 because nobody gets hurt, it is just annoying and stupid.
  • Industrial Safety
    This one is a bit confusing. It mentions Euratom a lot, so it is probably about Nuclear power stations. Suffice to say, if you are a UK company securing EU27 nukes, you might want to reconsider your life choices. This involves nukes, but only gets a 😦 because I have no idea if this ever happens.
  • Rules of Origin
    Fairly obvious consequence of Brexit, UK content in products no longer counts as EU content. EU 27 operators intending to take advantage of preferences are advised to:
    “treat any United Kingdom inputs as ‘non-originating’ when determining the EU preferential origin of their goods;”
    So, this means that EU27 exporters with UK components in their products might want to think carefully about whether they still meet the criteria for efficient exports. If we make parts for products that are close to the limit then the manufacturer might switch to an EU27 supplier. Could be a big deal and involve loss of business so lets give it a 😐 There are possible gains from UK supply chains switching to UK suppliers to meet whatever levels are required for preferences when we start doing FTAs.
  • Customs enforcement of intellectual property rights
    You can ask customs to seize and destroy stuff coming into the union that violates your copyrights. So if some cheap knockoff of your product is coming in from the far east you can get customs to deal with the fakes. After Brexit we won’t be able to stop knockoffs of our products getting into the EU quite so easily (not impossible) There are some hugely complicated sentences on page 2 around existing requests to customs. This doesn’t just apply to branded clothing, it can be everything including industrial products and car components. It isn’t great for UK businesses, however I don’t think anyone is in serious trouble 😃
  • Marketing authorisation holders of centrally authorised medicinal products for human and veterinary use
    To sell drugs in the EU (legitimate drugs that is) you need to have a marketing authorisation holder. That person has to be in the EU, and right now, many pharmaceutical companies in the UK have their marketing authorisation in the UK. Some activities like pharmacovigilance and batch release have to happen in the union. In this document the EU is suggesting the industry transfers things into the EU in time for Brexit. I would imagine that the companies concerned will have EU27 subsidiaries and it would be possible to get relevant staff to relocate so this gets a 😦. If I am wrong about that it means that medicines will be taken off the market while this is sorted, which might be a bit of a 💩 depending on what the particular medicine is for.
  • Trade Marks
    Anyone holding a trademark or working at a brand that sells into Europe may find enforcing the trademark against violations is harder. 😃
  • Medicinal products for human and veterinary use.
    Lets start by giving this one a 💩 because any problems with medicinal product authorisation is gonna be bad for someone. If you are marketing these products in the EU27 you need a marketing authorisation holder in the Union. Pharmaceutical companies can probably sort this out — they tend to be big enough, but it might be the case that if marketing moves to the EU27 access to new medicines in the UK might be disrupted.
  • Guarantees of origin of electricity from renewable energy sources
    UK certifications of installers of fancy technology like geothermal pumps and photovoltaics are going to be invalid in the EU 😦. Some of this is going to be quite annoying for the all-island electricity market in Ireland so it gets a 💩 for that aspect.
  • Electronic commerce and net neutrality
    yeah, this one is worse than it sounds. If you are providing information or ecommerce stuff, then you are subject to 27 sets of rules, dealing with each member state individually. 😦 Whether this would be practically enforced in any meaningful way is a little uncertain given the global nature of the internet.
  • Electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions
    This is to do with digital signatures and attestations. We should probably throw in a blockchain reference at this point to be on the safe side. If you are a trust service provider then you might want to think about moving. I don’t think this is a massive problem in practice 😃
  • Geo-blocking
    Ecommerce websites can screw you around based on your geographical location. You are no longer protected from it, but I have no idea why they would do that, so this gets a 😃
  • Audiovisual media services
    For broadcasters and content owners this is important, it relates to the country of origin and jurisdiction of the broadcast, and whether member states have to give the freedom to transmit. Some broadcasters may relocate or concentrate only on the domestic UK market 😐
  • Civil justice and private international law
    Enforcing court orders made in the UK will be hard in the EU and vice versa, including family court orders. This is going to screw over any divorced “citizens of nowhere” with court orders around child custody and maintenance payment issues. This gets a 😦 because real families are going to suffer.
  • Copyright
    This covers a range of copyright issues, probably sucks to be blind and dependent on Braille or spoken works for accessibility as there are copyright provisions to enable that. Also covers collective rights management, broadcasting and sui generis database access 😐
  • Industrial products
    For a heap of slightly special products (radio/cosmetics/pyrotechnics etc. etc.) you have to have an authorised representative, who must be based in the Union. Some products need to be certified by a notified body, which again must be in the EU27. This means quite a few companies are going to have a much harder time exporting and may need to relocate key staff into the EU27 😦
  • Information and consultation of workers at transnational level
    Something frightfully dull about trade unions. Corbyn would probably not like this, sounds like it is bad for workers rights. 😦
  • Electronic communications
    This relates to radio spectrum allocation and mobile roaming. Lots going on here, and it will cause some big media companies to leave. 😦 That roam like you are at home thing is probably gone — phone companies can charge what they like for roaming from third countries.
  • Security of network and information systems
    If you are a digital service provider offering services into the union then you need a designated representative. This probably affects big content and streaming companies more than random small websites. 😐
  • .eu domain names
    Sucks to be leave.eu because that domain name and all other .eu domains can only be held by people with an EU27 presence. If you stop meeting that condition the domain can be taken away. Just like that. 😐 Chances are they won’t bother proactively taking away domains already held unless someone else challenges the claim to the domain. Hmm, I might need to work on a plan to take away the leave.eu domain just for the giggles.
  • Euratom
    OK, straight to 💩 for this one, we are out of the common supply policy of fissile materials. Licensing of movements of hot radioactive waste gets a lot harder when it is a third country import or export. Not insurmountable problems if we remain a reputable country. “Failed state with nukes” isn’t a good look, so lets try and avoid that. 💩 As for the stuff in the newspapers about Euratom and cancer treatments, that is largely bullshit. The hot and fizzy stuff that we need to get fresh is tc-99m which is for diagnosis, not treatment.
  • EU Ship Recycling Regulation
    Ship recycling facilities in the UK are not going to be recycling any EU27 ships unless the commission list them as 3rd country facilities. I guess this is fairly big money 😐
  • customs and indirect taxation
    This one is super important, it points out that the Authorised Economic Operators of the UK will no longer be AEOs and customs will need to enforce the union customs code at the border with the UK. VAT will also have to change, so no more EC Sales List etc. we won’t be in the EU VAT territory so all companies are going to have to take this into account. This is huge so gets a 💩even though nobody dies directly from this.
  • Aviation safety rules
    This covers problems we will have with certifications of planes, pilots, cabin crew, maintenance and so on. If the certification isn’t right, the insurance isn’t right and the flight will not happen. This is a real possibility and gets a 💩 because it is going to be a right bugger to fix, especially if we are having a strop about paying the divorce bill.
  • EU Ecolabel
    UK manufacturers and international manufacturers currently getting EU Ecolabels on appliances from the UK competent body are going to have to transfer to an EU27 issuer. 😃
  • EU waste law
    There are quite tight regulations on import and export of waste from the union, this is to stop dumping it on countries with poor environmental standards and to stop importing too much waste because, well, it is waste. This is going to be a pain if you are in that industry. I would imagine there are no bin collections that cross the Ireland border, that kind of thing doesn’t cross county boundaries so I doubt it crosses the border in Ireland. Probably not a huge problem in the main 😃
  • Asset Management
    If you have a pension, it is probably in the hands of asset managers, who may find they can’t manage or market funds in the EU. This might be a bigger problem for EU27 people with assets under management but I am not sure. Big money, and it might delay people getting pension payments if it goes very wrong, so it gets a 😦.
  • Air transport
    Airlines are going to be a bit screwed. Passengers and don’t forget cargo. There is a very real chance that for a period of time there will be no legal basis for planes to be in the air, which means they will not be insured which means the wheels will be firmly planted on the tarmac. When they do start up again cabotage flights are off the menu. That is important for the Irish airlines Aer Lingus and Ryanair to be able to fly from Belfast to London and Manchester because that is an internal flight in a foreign country — even if some people don’t like to be reminded of that. Because air travel is how we fix things in a hurry and everything else will be broken at the same time, this gets a 💩.
  • Banking and payment services
    Banks and payment processors with subsidiaries in the EU27 are going to have some extra hoops to jump through as they will be branches of a third country establishment. 😐
  • Breeding of animals
    If you are into thoroughbred animals, including horses, then you might well be interested in this. There is big money in stud work and pedigree animals listed in breeding books. 😐
  • Credit rating agencies
    This is about using credit ratings for regulatory purposes, such as things sovereigns are allowed to invest in I think. This might mean that some ratings agency activities leave the UK (Standard and Poor’s has a London office) and/or it might mean that institutional investors move money about because of ratings changes. 😐
  • Data protection
    This references the GDPR but probably needs a post-GDPR update. There could well be an “adequacy decision” — especially if we don’t do anything unthinkably stupid like listen to Jacob Rees-Mogg’s advice and welch on the financial commitments. Failing that some activities that require data protection could continue on the basis of derrogations if the data controller has adequate safeguards. 😃
  • The exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters
    If you are the next Del Boy, exporting Peckam Spring water you might want to focus on the domestic market because you are not going to be exporting. UK springwater brands like Malvern water are not going to be exporting. I figured it might affect Northern Ireland, but when looking for an impacted brand I found this delightfully familiar story about Mourne water. 😦
  • Import/export licences for certain goods
    Well this gets a 💩because we step outside union law that stops us sending barbiturates to the USA if they might be used for the death penalty. Chances are the UK still won’t send Trump any lethal injections. It covers a heap of more interesting products that will need import/export licensing to cross the channel when it becomes an external border of the Union.
  • Inland waterways
    We are not going to be working on the rivers or lakes of the EU. Not entirely clear why we would be doing a lot of that. Maybe an issue for the waterways that make up a lot of the border with Ireland. 😐
  • Insurance / reinsurance
    This is important for companies that provide insurance and people who have insurance. That might be for cars, planes, buildings, ships etc. If your insurance isn’t valid on a ship or plane that is a rather serious matter, so this gets a 💩 for the money and for the consequences of invalid insurance.
  • Maritime transport
    If you are in shipping this affects you. There is a bit on safety of fishing vessels, and how they are going to be a bit more controlled by member sates when fishing in their waters under a UK flag. Something to do with the Torremolinos Protocol whatever that is. 😐 This one also mentions cabotage, which is a word we need to use more.
  • Marketing of seeds and other plant reproductive propagating material
    If you export seeds to the EU27, now would be a good time to find a new job 😐.
  • Markets in financial instruments
    This covers what happens if we don’t get a MIFID II equivalence decision. It involves lots of money in financial services, and is rather important for London, it describes how the current passport system for marketing financial services is not going to apply to us. Bit of a 💩 really.
  • Post-trade financial services
    This is something to do with derivatives and clearing. It involves massiveamounts of money and gets a 💩 because London is going to struggle with this rather a lot as the EU27 financiers leave London and take the business with them.
  • Public procurement
    This is about the public sector putting things out to tender, many UK companies bid for public sector contracts across the EU27, but now we fall into the less advantageous rules as a third country tenderer. We could now be excluded from contracts where 50% of the deal isn’t from the EU27 or if it requires security clearance that won’t be recognised. On the flip side (kind of) we can make it harder for EU27 companies to bid on UK tenders but that means we may not be spending taxpayer money on the best value supplier.😐
  • Rail transport
    This most obviously affects Eurotunnel and Eurostar, for certification of rolling stock and drivers. 😐
  • Road transport
    Car drivers may require an international driving permit to assert that their UK licence is a valid 3rd country licence. This costs about £5.50 and probably will be required for most member states unless they change their own laws which will currently recognise licences of EEA member states without an IDP just like our laws do 😐.
    Commercial drivers are considerably more screwed, that is passenger vehicles and goods vehicles. To be a union operator you will need a transport manager in the EU27, otherwise you are a third country operator. That means you can’t do cabotage runs (not gonna explain that, look it up and use the word cabotage much much more) and if you do a lot of commercial transport in the EU27 you are going to have to seriously consider moving there. 😦
  • Statutory audit
    If you are a UK auditor then you are not going to be auditing in the EU27, this will affect the big accountancy firms I think. If they send an audit team to cover a multinational then they might well not send a UK based team in any more. Sucks to be them, but great news if you are an EU27 based auditor. 😦
  • Substances of human origin (blood, tissues and cells, and organs)
    I wrote to my MP about this one (article on that to follow), the trade in spare parts for humans is in quite a lot of bother. This is going to cause deaths so it gets a 💩 . The land border in Ireland is a very serious place where this will cause problems. Ambulances crossing the border with blood on board are going to be a problem and if you need a replacement second hand human component you might find it can’t be sourced from quite such a wide area.
  • The Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS)
    This is about certifying things to environmental standards, probably similar to ISO14001. If you are an EMAS auditor then you are not going to be one after Brexit. This probably also means if you are a company with a certification then you won’t have it any more. If you are in a supply chain that requires you to have this certification to be an approved supplier then you are gonna have a bad 2019. 😦
  • The European Citizens’ Initiative
    Yeah, OK, this is the kind of thing the leavers hate about the EU the most. Direct democracy in the European context doesn’t play into the narrative of the “undemocratic EU” especially when it is the kind of democratic input where foreign people can join in too. Clearly we are out of all that, but it won’t do us much harm. 😃
  • type-approval of certain vehicles and engines
    As far as I can make out this is about non-road mobile machinery, so that could be things like cherry pickers, construction machinery, chainsaw engines that kind of thing. As with all the other type approval problems, if you make this stuff you need an authorised representative in the EU27 if you want to sell there. 😐
  • type-approval of motor vehicles
    UK approvals of motor vehicles (not just cars) are not going to be valid, they will need type approval in a member state and will need a marketing representative in the EU27. This is going to affect big companies and disproportionately hurt small ones like Morgan or JCB. This is on top of stepping outside the 10% CET levy on cars, so some might not bother to export any more and will just downsize. 😦
  • Union plant variety rights
    I think this means that breeders of plants who are quite possessive about the intellectual property of the species they create though careful cross-pollination are going to have some issues. 😃
  • Animal feed
    People selling animal feed or additives are going to need a representative in the EU27 as an authorisation holder. This probably isn’t going to stop animals being fed, so it gets a 😃
  • animal health and welfare and public health related to the movement of live animals
    We step outside of a bunch of regulations on live animal transport. In fact, lets give up on it altogether. Not gonna happen. There is a pointer to a procedure for using the UK as a land bridge between Ireland and the rest of the EU27, but basically animal exports are over. 😐
  • Authorisations and certificates for live animal transport
    If you drive live animals around then you need an EU27 certificate. This applies to lorry loads of animals as well as the Ireland situation of a couple of pigs going to market in a horsebox being towed by a muddy Landcruiser. 😦
  • Biocidal Products
    If you are in the weedkiller business you probably need to be worried about this. Think we can be cautiously optimistic in general. 😃
  • Certificates of competence slaughterhouse operators
    UK citizens working in EU27 slaughterhouses are going to need to recertify. I am sure this will be fine, if in fact there are any. More interestingly a lot of UK abattoirs are staffed by EU27 vets. Dunno how that is going to play out. 😃
  • Company law
    All companies doing business in the EU are a bit screwed, the member states won’t recognise the limited liability protection of companies (that “ltd” bit after the company name is important) so shareholders may be held personally liable for company debts. This may mean that institutional shareholders get the hell out of UK companies 😟 branches of UK companies fall into different rules as the HQ would be in a third country, probably no big deal 😃. Some stuff around mergers changes, that might be important to big city financier types 😐.
  • Consumer protection and passenger rights
    We are going to have fewer legal avenues for enforcing rights as consumers, less automatic rights to compensation 😃
  • Fisheries and aquaculture
    Access to Union waters and ports needs specific authorisation, along with exports. We do currently do quite a bit of fishing outside our own waters and we export most of what we catch. Our fishing industry is going to be quite badly screwed over by the problems of a Brexit they enthusiastically created, so they get a frowny face and a very small violin. 😦 🎻
  • Food Law
    Exporters of food need to read this, they will be exports from a third country so the labeling requirements change among other things. This is perhaps a little academic as we won’t be exporting any food of animal origin without a competent authority and list of authorised establishments. As this contributes to the food shortages this gets a 💩.
  • Genetically Modified Food and Feed and the deliberate release of Genetically Modified Organisms into the environment
    Not a big deal at the moment, bit of a shame if you are into GMO research, but it isn’t entirely clear whether the UK will get more or less receptive to GMO experiments after Brexit. Lets give this an optimistic 😃
  • Plant Health
    This is about phytosanitary border controls which we will be stepping outside of. This could be a significant border issue. 😦
    At the moment any pallet will do for moving goods around, after Brexit everything will need to be on export grade pallets, with an ISPM15 stamp showing it has been heat treated for woodworm and other beasties. This is a little leaf/feather thing you will see on pallets if you keep your eyes open. This is going to be quite a big pain and the less we comply the more inspections will happen at the borders.
  • Plant Protection Products
    UK companies selling pesticides into the EU have to jump through a bunch of hoops around testing residue levels, and they can’t be done in a third country. We don’t know if the UK will recognise union certification of pesticides this is probably going to be sorted out by everyone filling more forms and spending more money, however if there is a politically caused pesticide shortage that could impact farming yields and lead to famine level food shortages. This one gets a 💩 just because there is potential for widescale deaths if the politicians are spectacularly incompetent.
  • The minimum level of training of seafarers and the mutual recognition of seafarers’ certificates
    Sailors and other seafarers with a UK qualification won’t be working on EU27 flagged vessels and vice versa — not a huge problem, just recertify with an oral exam in an EU member state and pay a few hundred Euro for the certificate 😐 (£378 for one of the UK certificates I found, but it varies from deckhand to master or engineer etc.)
  • Trade in protected species of wild fauna and flora
    Import and export of protected species is going to be harder as a third country. No great surprise there. Bad if you are into that kind of thing, but I can’t imagine it is hugely significant in the big picture. 😃
  • medicinal products for human and veterinary use within the framework of the Centralised Procedure
    Quite long! bit of a Q and A for the pharmaceutical industry. The industry will be much more dependent on contacts in the EU27 to market the products. Maybe some highly qualified people will have to leave the country to enable those companies to keep production in the UK 😦.
  • Illegal logging and associated trade
    This seems to impose border controls on timber imports and exports to ensure it was legally logged. That could get annoying if it includes manufactured goods like wooden furniture. 😐
  • Supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products and plant protection products
    Something to do with patents expiring or being renewed. Probably means more paperwork for someone, but patents can be evil so I will give it a 😃
  • Internal energy market
    This is to do with some important stuff that keeps the lights on 💩 it covers the regulatory framework that governs the electricity interconnects (which were not around in 1973) and the gas pipelines and also something about prospecting for oil and gas.
  • Occupational retirement provision
    Pension funds paying out to EU27 citizens may have to transfer to an EU27 fund, this could move a fairly substantial amount of capital out of the UK. Some people may have issues getting their pension payments for a bit. 💩

A less stupid way to do Brexit — the Reverse 49

The people voted for Brexit. Slow handclap, you idiots. Now, because democracy, we have to do the stupid thing. You used a powerful tool without appropriate thought for the consequences to yourselves and other people. I do still have a tiny little bit of sympathy for those who expected our government to approach the problem competently. It didn’t need to be going quite this badly.

We are currently negotiating with the objective of being a full third country on 30th March 2019. There may be a cliff edge delay period after that (to the end of 2020) if we agree some stuff that really doesn’t matter because we are not going to agree it. This is stupid and people are going to die. Maybe quite a lot of people. We know we supported a population of 56 million on the trade arrangements of 1973, and I expect we could still support that level of population. There are now 65 million of us and we voted away our freedom to leave. There are ways of doing Brexit which do not have a high body count. One would be to relax some red lines and apply to join EFTA and stay in the EEA. This is the first stages of the Flexcit plan (yes, some leavers had a plan, but inevitably the more thoughtful People’s Front of Judea was shunned by the well funded criminals of the Judean People’s Front and the plan never got popular attention.) The latter stages of the Flexcit plan go a bit weird, but the first moves are pretty sound, go read it.

I would now like to have some attention and thought put to another way to do a low body count Brexit. The Reverse 49.

Accession to the European Union involves a candidate country aligning their legal system and reforming internal processes so they are compatible with the rules of the EU. The legal basis for joining the EU like this is Article 49 (yup, right next door to the Article 50 which you already know about). This is a process that is done over a number of years, and it is divided up into 35 chapters of the Aquis(the collection of EU laws). You can read about the 35 chapters here and the general accession process here. In principle it is a one way process, you start at the beginning and at the end you join the EU. Turkey is going through this process and got a bit stuck halfway. They are going to need to back out (or have a stern word with themselves, but for this conversation backing out is more interesting).

There is no massive or unchangeable reason why this accession process has to always run forwards. Time reverse it and you can unscramble the egg. The UK on March 30th 2019 could be considered to be an accession state to the EU with all 35 chapters closed and done. Fully aligned (except for the Euro and Shengen bits perhaps). We could then re-open the chapters one by one, and implement domestic legislation to serve our purposes in each of the 35 topic areas. This means we don’t have the utterly stupid “retained EU law” concept that won’t work at all and will mean we have a broken statute book for however long it lasts. We have proper domestic legislation passed through parliament covering the needs we would have as a distinct country. It means we break things one by one, and when something breaks (like cabotage flights or whatever) everything else keeps working so we can deal with the crisis and move on. We are simply not going to be able to cope with everything breaking on the same day, including the tools we would normally use to fix stuff.

Doing a Reverse 49 means:

  • We implement the democratic mandate of the idiots who asked for it. (We won’t be a member state of the EU on 30th March 2019)
  • We get rid of deadly deadlines and have a sound legal framework to keep on talking and to unpick things one by one (cherry unpicking perhaps).
  • We can start with some relatively harmless chapters, leaving the land borders unchanged until someone gives the 52% a slap and asks them to articulate what exactly they thought would happen when they voted to diverge from Ireland. By the way, if you have not read it yet, do read the Good Friday Agreement now and you can be happy in the knowledge that you are more clued up on how the UK works than our immigration minister is.
  • We are in a process in which we can decide to turn around and move forward and rejoin the EU if it turns out that on reflection leaving was an utterly stupid idea.
  • We are in a process in which we can continue to diverge smoothly to the sunlit buccaneering uplands if at any stage they should come into view.
  • We can stop arguing now about everything in the negotiations, we stay in the EU budget and back out slowly, decommitting the EU27 from UK expenditure as we go and reducing our budget contributions commensurately, just like an accession state coming in.
  • We could get a sequence of more granular choices, allowing democratic input from parliament at each stage and a public debate on how we want to manage matters differently. We can debate our new phytosanitary measures and the Brexiters can tell us exactly what diseased goods they were desperate to let in that the EU wouldn’t let us.
  • We could fix our own democracy as we go. I don’t recall many Brexiters campaigning to free Erskin May or get rid of the Spiritual Lords and disestablish the church (why do we have a theocracy?) but apparently Brexiters are super charged up about our domestic parliament having sovereign powers (which it had all along). Lets fix it so we can exercise those powers properly. At the moment there is no time to do any reforming because we are doing Brexit instead.
  • We could even decide whether to do the Harrogate Agenda bit of Flexcit (hell no, in my opinion, but this is a democracy, we can talk about it)
  • We end up with a working domestic statute book with no retained EU law. It is hard to find enough swearwords to describe just how inappropriate and non-functional EU regulations are going to be when enacted as domestic law alongside existing primary and secondary legislation. (if you don’t believe me read any EU regulation at random and think what would happen if that text was domestic law and we were not a member state)

If you think a Reverse 49 is impossible, let me know why in the comments. If you think it is a less dreadful idea than the Brexit path we are on, then maybe tell your MP or tweet about #Reverse49 or add your thoughts on how the plan could work. Maybe write about it as if it was your idea and pitch it with a different attitude, that is fine by me.

If you just want to stop Brexit and are angry that I am a defeatist quitter, then smashing, go and march on 23rd June. Totally support that, I will probably be there. Unless the government proposes separate legislation to support a referendum on a meaningful question, you have to face the reality that the vote isn’t going to happen (we have already run out of time for the supporting legislation, we don’t even have to speculate on what the result might be). The ERG Tories will block any efforts to ask the people again and they will just let the clock run out because they are sociopathic monsters. They can do that, and they will. The Reverse 49 approach does not rely on lots of our MPs suddenly growing a conscience and wanting to protect us from the consequences of a bad choice, it just gets them out of the hole they have dug for themselves. I believe this approach offers benefits for our MPs, nation state sovereignty fetishists, people who like to have enough food to eat, the other EU member states, people who like having a job, and those who just want to get on with life with less political junk on the news.

If you are now crying tears of rage that a remoaning traitor saboteur is trying to steal your Brexit from you that you won for your very self, then you might reflect on the fact that your Brexit will not stick if you allow it to happen in the most stupid way possible. You will get to suffer the consequences of your actions briefly, and then we will do an article 49 accession, and we will join the Euro, and we will push for ever closer union, and we will have freedom of movement, and we will do everything that we can to ensure that everything you hate the most happens. A gradual Brexit is the only type that can stick. Finally, before I forget: You are a dick.

I commend this proposal to the Internet.

We really are leaving the EEA

To leave the EEA (roughly the same thing as the single or internal market, encompassing EFTA and the EU) one normally has to give notice, a process that is defined in article 127 of the EEA agreement. The UK has not done this. I was curious whether this would mean we stay in the EEA, but I was struggling to get a straight answer to the question, so I tried a less straight question, addressed to the Europe Direct service.

The UK has notified the EU of an intention to leave the EU and EEA by following article 50 TEU.
 The UK asserts that this is valid notice to leave the EEA treaty, so that letter should be taken as valid notice under article 127 EEA. Article 127 EEA places the following obligation on EEA contracting parties
 “Immediately after the notification of the intended withdrawal, the other Contracting Parties shall convene a diplomatic conference in order to envisage the necessary modifications to bring to the Agreement.”
 
 Such a conference has not been convened and there are now less than 12 months remaining to the notice given. Either the contracting parties are in breach of article 127 EEA or valid notice under article 127 EEA has not been given.
 
 Please could you clarify whether this conference is going to be called bringing the contracting parties into line with their obligation, or whether the UK will remain in the EEA after 29th March 2019.

So, instead of directly asking what is going to happen, I claimed that the other member states were not meeting their obligation to convene a conference, in the hope that phrasing it this way would force an answer to be given. I was in essence agreeing with the UK government position. Today I got this answer:

Dear Mr Bell,
 
 Please accept our apologies for the delayed response. Your enquiry has been dealt in consultation with Article 50 Task Force (TF50).
 
 We acknowledge receipt of your enquiry addressed to the European Commission regarding Article 127 EEA. You wish to know in particular whether the conference to which Article 127 EEA refers is going to be convened.
 
 Article 127 EEA provides that each “Contracting Party” may withdraw from the EEA Agreement provided it gives at least twelve months’ notice in writing to the other Contracting Parties.
 
 The term “Contracting Parties” is defined in Article 2(c) EEA as follows: “concerning the Community and the EC Member States, the Community and the EC Member States, or the Community, or the EC Member States.” The wording of this provision shows that EU Member States become members of the EEA solely by reason of their EU membership. A further confirmation of the interdependency between EU membership and EEA membership is provided by Article 128 EEA, by virtue of which any new EU Member State is obliged to become a party of the EEA Agreement. EU Membership and EEA membership go hand in hand.
 
 Article 126 EEA provides that the EEA Agreement “shall apply to the territories to which the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty”. Consequently, when a Member State withdraws from the Union, the EEA Agreement ceases automatically to apply to that Member State whose territory is no longer part of the “territories to which the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is applied.” 
 
 Following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, the UK territory will no longer be part of the “territories to which the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is applied”, and the EEA Agreement will consequently cease automatically to apply to the United Kingdom. Therefore serving a withdrawal notice or convening a diplomatic conference under Article 127 EEA do not appear to be necessary.
 
 We hope you find this information useful. Please contact us again if you have other questions about the European Union, its activities or institutions.

So, the EU agrees with the UK government, that separate notice to leave the EEA is not required, and that as we are not leaving through the door, but chucking ourselves out through the window, a diplomatic conference does not appear to be necessary. This means that as of our departure from the EU, we will not be in the single market and able to trade on those advantageous terms. This probably doesn’t come as news to anyone, but it does lock down some assumptions that people thought they knew were true.

The Softest USA-Canada Border Crossing

There has been some talk of the USA Canada border crossing being a useful model for the future arrangements for the land border on the island of Ireland. It isn’t really. You can go and look on Google maps and streetview at the various crossings, all but one have border posts on both sides with a fence and gate, most look like a toll plaza, but even the ones in the middle of nowhere have a control point on the border. All but one.

An open border?

There is a little chunk of America that you can only get to by boat, or from Canada. That is the Northwest Angle. There is some border infrastructure, notably a sign saying

WELCOME TO THE UNITED STATES

You are entering the Northwest Angle, Minnesota

You must report to U.S. Customs and Border Patrol via the videophone at Jim’s Corner (7 miles ahead)

You must report to Canada Border Services via the videophone before returning to Canada

RABC Permit holders with no goods to declare are exempt from this requirement

Onwards we must go to Jim’s corner, where we find a shed, with a videophone with two buttons on it, one for Canada, one for the United States, presumably they put you through to a very bored person eating Hickory Sticks/Donuts at one of the staffed crossings in the middle of nowhere.

You are at Jim’s Corner!

I have to admit that there isn’t a particularly deep and meaningful message in this article, I just thought it was a curious little story to tell, and I guess it shows that the most insignificant USA/Canada crossing still has a level of border control that is considerably more intrusive than that found at any of our current land borders with the EU

Another Brexit dividend, the return of the Apple Snail?

I have recently become aware of a new reason for doing Brexit. If you are a keen aquarist in the UK you might in the past have kept a few Apple Snails, to keep the glass clean. They munch up all the algae and reduce the maintenance work. They are no longer sold in the UK and this is because of the EU. Yes, those meddling eurocrats in Brussels have banned snails! After Brexit we can have our clean aquaria back again if we want, as Merlin777 put it:

“I’m looking for something that will help keep the algae down and add some interest — either colourful, stripey, active etc. I used to have golden apple snails which were ideal because they were colourful and entertaining with their antics but I understand they are being phased out thanks to those silly EU people. (Maybe we’ll get them unbanned after brexit?).”

It turns out that this really is a thing, it is true, and we could indeed decide to have cleaner tanks after Brexit, but lets dig into this issue a little deeper and find out how silly those EU people really are.

The EU have issued a decision banning imports of apple snails. This will on the face of it become retained EU law after Brexit, and we can then repeal it if we want to. The reason apple snails are banned is because they can be a particularly devastating invasive species if released into the wild. They eat macrophytes which has knock on effects that are not good. We can however relax, they would just die in our cold British water, their lifecycle requires a fairly narrow band of temperatures for the eggs and adults to thrive. The EU commissioned a study (probably with some Horizon 2020 funding) based on 25km grid squares across Europe to see where the areas with a microclimate that might support these snails are located.


See, we are fine! The map shows exactly where these slimy little bastards can survive, and it is nowhere near the UK. The UK has no reason whatsoever to fear the shell suited migrant molluscs with an EU ASBO. This is a clear example of an EU law that we have to comply with in the UK, just for the benefit of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece and Turkey.

The free circulation of goods in the internal market is why we can’t have nice things, like clean newt tanks. There is no way that the EU could ban snail egg contaminated products from just the specific risk areas. In Brexit UK we totally could make our own apple snail rule, allowing for sparkly clean tanks, and we could relax inspections on imported products from places with Apple snails, but if we did that we can’t also have an open border with the EU — they can’t let our slack snail attitude risk introduction of an invasive species around the Mediterranean. There would have to be phytosanitary inspections on all plant imports to the EU from the UK to check risky plants for eggs of the dastardly snails.

So, it is rational to decide that there is potential of a clear Brexit dividend to the aquaria of the UK, but this has to be weighed up against the costs associated with the same change. If our environment secretary Michael Gove decides that the future is cold blooded and slithery he could well decide that a bespoke policy for the UK doesn’t need to follow this EU rule. That wouldn’t be the EU erecting a barrier between us and them — it just means we step to the other side of the barrier that is already there.

You might also note that this issue has got nothing to do with tariffs, or being in a customs union or the customs union. It is an issue of regulatory alignment, as our laws diverge we take a step outside of the barriers to trade that we helped to construct. If Northern Ireland is to have no hard border with Ireland we need to have alignment — and a mechanism for maintaining alignment as changes occur. Any future plans you might hear over the next few weeks in the series of speeches that doesn’t sound like it preserves the snail ban is a non-starter.

Apple Snails are freshwater, so Gary probably isn’t one.

EU Notices about Brexit

Thanks to the utterly stupid letter David Davis sent to the Prime Minister whining about the EU preparing for Brexit it seems that our media has woken up to all the stuff that it was their job to notice last month. For some reason newspapers never seem to link to primary sources, they just quote and paraphrase from documents, if you want more than a summary you have to go digging. These are the notices that I am aware of, several of which I read when they were released, some I found today. Let me know if I missed any, the FT thinks there are about 15, with a bit of help I found 18 so far.

  • Trade marks
  • Road Transport
  • Air Transport
  • Civil Justice & Private International Law
  • Marketing authorisations for medical products for human and animal use
  • Data Protection
  • Company law
  • Mineral Water
  • Plant protection and pesticides
  • Biocides
  • Genetically modified food and organisms
  • Plant breeders
  • Seafarers
  • Animal breeders
  • Blood, tissue, cells and organs
  • Slaughterhouses and fur farms
  • Transport of live animals
  • Industrial products imports and distribution
  • Public Procurement

https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/news/Brexit_preparedness_notice_on_IP.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/legislation/2017-12-11-notice-to-stakeholders-road-transport.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/legislation/2017-12-11-notice-to-stakeholders-air-transport.pdfhttp://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2017/05/WC500226603.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/labelling-nutrition_mineral-waters_notice_business_operators_comm-art50_brexit_20171012.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/pesticides_notice_business_operators-art50_201709.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/biocides/docs/brexit_note_en.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/gmo_notice_business_operators-art50_201709.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/plant/docs/ppr_legis_letter_comm-cpvo-art50_20170707.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/legislation/2017-12-11-notice-to-stakeholders-seafarer-qualifications.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/zootechnics_brexit_notice_to_breeders.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/blood_tissues_organs/docs/2017_btc_brexit_en.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/aw_brexit_notice_slaughter.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/aw_brexit_notice_transporters.pdfhttps://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/27241/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/nativehttps://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/27347/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native

The Amendments to the Withdrawal Bill

There are 191 pages of amendments to the withdrawal bill. Each one is a little patch to apply to the bill as introduced and they don’t make exciting reading. For each one there is a small statement of what they are trying to do, like a pull request there is a description and the diff. There is a big ass PDF file produced of all the amendments, which are freeform lists of what to change. The MPs will then chat about them for 8 days and vote on some of them, spending 15 minutes for each disputed vote as they walk through the lobbies after ringing the bell to drag people out of the pub (really), it is spectacularly inefficient.

The amendment document is fairly consistent, and might well be the output of some kind of document management system but there are no useful tags I could see in the HTML or PDF outputs. Our democracy would be better if the legislature used something structured like Git, but they don’t. Lets add Git for laws to the list of things we could have done instead of Brexit that would improve our democracy without anyone getting hurt. The numbering of the amendments is almost completely incomprehensible, but I extracted the explanatory statements with some tools, this was the key command:

pdf2txt euwithdrawal_daily_cwh_1113.pdf|sed -n ‘/Member’s explanatory statement/,/^$/p’

I then did a bit of massaging of the output with a text editor (mostly to fix spacing and line breaks). I think some amendments might have more than one paragraph of explanation, and some might be mangled by unfortunate page breaks, please do comment if you spot any errors and I will update the list. As far as I can see, none of the amendments address my previously stated concerns. It still won’t explain where the authoritative version of retained EU law will be lodged, and they will go through the whole process of approving this bill without demonstrating that it works on a single complete example of an EU regulation and none of them challenge the assertion that we can process 120 regulations per week for two years solid. I can’t see anything pointing out that on day 1 our law starts out deeply screwed and only gets fixed after two years of having bad law.

There is basically nothing I can do to have an input into this, we are all spectators in this shitshow of incompetence, and we all have to suffer the consequences, but lets look at the next steps anyway. After both sides have done their 8 days of histrionic virtue signalling, all the amendments will be voted down and the Tories will pass this stupid bill, probably with opposition support. In the mean time, our negotiators will fail to do their job and negotiate a settlement of the financial commitments we have made. They won’t even see the shortcut for the lazy that I pointed out. Next week on the 20th the the EMA and EBA contests will come to a conclusion and we will see where our pharmaceutical industry and the city will head off to. Finally we will have about a year of nothing useful happening, before we all get front row seats for an unstoppable cascade failure of basically everything at once.

On that cheery note, here are the explanatory notes for all of the amendments to be discussed in the committee of the whole house:

  • This amendment would ensure that the United Kingdom does not repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and exit the European Union unless and until a new Treaty establishing a future relationship between the UK and EU has been agreed and ratified by Parliament.
  • This amendment would ensure that the existing legal framework for customs duties and the Customs Union common external tariff framework would continue to be in effect after exit day.
  • This amendment would ensure that the Government produces a strategy which would enable the United Kingdom to continue to participate in key EU agencies and programmes.
  • This amendment would make the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 on exit day conditional on the Prime Minister reaching an agreement for the United Kingdom to remain a member of the EEA and Customs Union.
  • This amendment would make the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 on exit day conditional on the Prime Minister gaining consent from the devolved legislatures.
  • This amendment would require the UK Government to lay a report before the National Assembly for Wales outlining the effect of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on Welsh finances, before exercising the power under section 1. This would allow for scrutiny of the Leave Campaign’s promise to maintain current levels of EU funding for Wales.
  • This new clause would ensure that Ministers must set out in detail how the provisions in Clause 6 would apply during a transitional period before the United Kingdom fully implements a withdrawal agreement.
  • This amendment provides a scheme for interpretation of EU law and to provide a backstop where necessary transposition has not been effected by regulations made under Clause 7.
  • This paving amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
  • This amendment would bind UK courts to European Court principles laid down or decisions made after exit day if they related to an act before exit day.
  • This paving amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
  • This amendment would enable UK courts to refer matters to the European Court on or after exit day if those matters related to an act before exit day.
  • This amendment would help to ensure that Britain continues to have harmonious social standards with the EU.
  • The amendment would make clear that non-binding aids to the interpretation of EU law, such as background materials and official guidance produced before exit day, should continue to be taken into account by the courts when interpreting retained EU law to the same extent as at present.
  • This paving amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
  • This consequential Amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
  • This consequential Amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
  • This consequential Amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
  • This new clause would prevent delegated powers from other Acts being used to alter workplace protections, equality provisions, health and safety regulations or fundamental rights.
  • This new clause would ensure that Parliament is informed of changes in EU and EEA provisions that might have amended UK law if the UK had remained a member of those institutions beyond exit day.
  • This new clause provides a mechanism for Ministers to establish a list of technical provisions of retained EU law that may be amended by subordinate legislation outside of the time restrictions of the Bill.
  • This amendment would qualify the powers conferred to alter law by statutory instrument after exit day.
  • This new clause would ensure that after exit day, EU-derived employment rights, environmental protection, standards of equalities, health and safety standards and consumer standards can only be amended by primary legislation or subordinate legislation made under this Act.
  • This amendment would alter the definition of EU retained law so as only to include reserved areas of legislation. This will allow the National Assembly for Wales and the other devolved administrations to legislate on areas of EU derived law which fall under devolved competency for themselves.
  • This amendment, along with Amendment 64 to Schedule 8 would exclude the European Economic Area agreement from the Bill, allowing the UK to remain in the EEA.
  • The amendment would allow Ministers, with parliamentary approval, to apply EU legislation which has been passed before exit day but does not take full effect until after that day, along with subordinate measures made for the purposes of EU legislation which is retained under the Bill and taking effect after exit day.
  • This new clause seeks to transfer the EU Protocol on animal sentience set out in Article 13 of Title II of the Lisbon Treaty into UK law, so that animals continue to be recognised as sentient beings under domestic law.
  • This new clause would ensure that after withdrawal from the EU, the environmental principles of EU law would be retained as part of UK law.
  • This new clause would ensure that environmental principles under Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union would continue to apply in the UK after exit day.
  • The test set out at Clause 4(1)(a), that such rights are available in domestic law immediately before exit day, is sufficient for those rights to continue to be available following the UK’s exit from the EU.
  • This amendment would seek to preserve after exit from the EU any rights or obligations arising from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which applied in UK domestic law by virtue of its membership of the European Union.
  • Clause 4(2)(b) excludes rights arising under EU directives which are not recognised by the courts. This Amendment would remove Clause 4(2)(b) so that rights arising under EU directives (but not yet adjudicated on by the courts) are protected and continue to be available in UK courts.
  • New subsection (4) deals with a situation where the UK has incorrectly implemented a directive. In cases of incorrect implementation, reliance on the EU directive may still be necessary. New subsection (5) would ensure that where the UK has not correctly or completely implemented EU
  • This new clause would require Ministers to produce a report reviewing in full the implications of removing from UK law the Charter of Fundamental Rights — and the rights for UK citizens which it has help to guarantee.
  • This amendment would remove the reference to a rule of law passed or made before exit day.
  • This paving Amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
  • This amendment would remove the reference to a rule of law passed or made before exit day.
  • This amendment would remove the reference to a rule of law passed or made before exit day.
  • To allow the Charter of Fundamental rights to continue to apply domestically in the interpretation and application of retained EU law.
  • This amendment would remove the exclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights from retained EU law.
  • Clause 5(4) of the Bill excludes the Charter of Fundamental Rights from the ‘incorporation’ powers in the Bill. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to replicate Article 8 of the Charter (the Right to Protection of Personal Data) in UK domestic law within three months of the commencement of Clause 5.
  • This Amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
  • To allow challenges to be brought to retained EU law on the grounds that it is in breach of general principles of EU law.
  • This amendment clarifies that all the existing principles of EU law will be retained within domestic law whether they originate in the case law of the European Court, the EU treaties, direct EU legislation or EU directives. It also makes clear that the key environmental law principles in Article 191 of the Treaty are retained.
  • This amendment would retain the existing principles of EU law within domestic law whether they originate in the case law of the European Court, the EU treaties, direct EU legislation or EU directives. The freeze date would be at the end of any transitional arrangements.
  • This amendment leave out paragraph 3, thus retaining the right of action in domestic law in relation to general principles of EU law.
  • This amendment would remove the proposal to end rights in UK domestic law after exit day in relation to damages in accordance with the rule in Francovich.
  • This amendment, together with Amendments 140 and 141, would restore the right to obtain damages after exit day in respect of governmental failures before exit day to comply with European Union obligations.
  • This amendment would enable actions to be brought under the Francovich rule either before or after exit day if they related to an act before exit day.
  • This amendment ensures that the right to obtain damages if the Government fails to uphold its obligations continues as long as the UK remains under the existing structure of rules and regulation.
  • This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.
  • This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.
  • To allow challenges to be brought to retained EU law on the grounds that it is in breach of general principles of EU law and to allow damages to be awarded for any proven breach of such a principle.
  • This new clause would establish new procedures for the creation of UK-wide frameworks for retained EU law.
  • This new clause would put the Joint Ministerial Committee’s role in the withdrawal process on a statutory footing.
  • This amendment removes the Bill’s proposed restrictions on the ability of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate on devolved matters.
  • This amendment would replace the Bill’s changes to the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales in consequence of EU withdrawal, by removing the restriction on legislative competence relating to EU law and ensuring that no further restriction relating to retained EU law is imposed.
  • This amendment is intended to remove the proposed bar on the Scottish Parliament legislating inconsistently with EU law after exit day.
  • This amendment would remove the restrictions on the Scottish Parliament modifying retained EU law except in relation to matters that are reserved.
  • This amendment is intended to remove the proposed bar on the National Assembly for Wales legislating inconsistently with EU law.
  • This amendment would remove the restrictions on the National Assembly for Wales modifying retained EU law except in relation to matters that are reserved.
  • This amendment is intended to remove the proposed bar on the Northern Ireland Assembly legislating inconsistently with EU law.
  • This amendment would remove the restrictions on the Northern Ireland Assembly modifying retained EU law except in relation to matters that are reserved or excepted.
  • This amendment, alongside Amendment 42 and NC64, would establish that the UK Government has until the end of transitional arrangements to create any UK-wide frameworks.
  • This amendment would replace the Bill’s changes to the executive competence of the Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers in consequence of withdrawal from the EU, by removing the restriction on competence relating to EU law and ensuring that no further restriction relating to retained EU law is imposed.
  • This consequential amendment, linked to Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3, would change a heading in the Scotland Act 1998 to remove a reference to retained EU law.
  • This consequential amendment, linked to Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3, would change the definition of devolution issues in the Scotland Act 1998.
  • This consequential amendment, linked to Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3, would enable changes to the procedure for subordinate legislation in the Scotland Act 1998.
  • This amendment makes a change consequential on Amendment 165, which would omit section 80 of the Government of Wales Act 2006, making section 58A (4)(d) of that Act redundant.
  • Amendment 165 omits section 80 of the Government of Wales Act 2006. This amendment would amend the changes made to the heading before section 80 to reflect the omission of section 80 of the Government of Wales Act 2006.
  • This amendment makes a change consequential on Amendment 165, which would omit section 80 of the Government of Wales Act 2006, making paragraph 31 of Schedule 3 in this Bill redundant.
  • This new clause is intended to preserve the principles of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement which underpin the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
  • This amendment seeks to ensure that the rights provided for under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement continue to be implemented and are protected.
  • This amendment would limit the power available to a devolved authority to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law arising from withdrawal in such a way that it could only make provision that is essential to that end.
  • This amendment would limit the power available to a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law arising from withdrawal in such a way that they could only make provision that is essential to that end.
  • This amendment would include the power to confer a power to legislate among the powers of the Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 1 of Schedule 2 to fix problems in retained EU law arising from withdrawal, in line with a Minister of the Crown’s powers under Clause 7.
  • This amendment would provide that the power of the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 1 of Schedule 2 extends to amending directly applicable EU law incorporated into UK law, in line with a Minister of the Crown’s power in Clause 7.
  • This amendment would provide that the power of the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 1 of Schedule 2 includes the power to confer functions which correspond to functions to make EU tertiary legislation, in line with a Minister of the Crown’s power in Clause 7.
  • This amendment would replace the requirement for consent from a Minister of the Crown for regulations made by Scottish Ministers or Welsh Ministers in fixing problems in retained EU law that arise from withdrawal if they come into force before exit day or remove reciprocal arrangements with a requirement for Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers to consult with a Minister of the Crown before making the regulations.
  • This is a consequential amendment linked to Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3.
  • This amendment is intended to remove the proposed restriction in the Bill on devolved authorities modifying retained direct EU legislation etc.
  • This is a consequential amendment linked to Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3.
  • This amendment, and Amendments 323, 324 and 325, would prevent the Welsh Ministers from
  • This amendment, and Amendments 322, 324 and 325, would prevent the Welsh Ministers from using powers proposed in the Bill (to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law arising from withdrawal) to amend the Government of Wales Act 2006.
  • This amendment, and Amendments 322, 323 and 325, would prevent the Welsh Ministers from using powers proposed in the Bill (to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law arising from withdrawal) to amend the Government of Wales Act 2006.
  • This amendment, and Amendments 322, 323 and 324, would prevent the Welsh Ministers from using powers proposed in the Bill (to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law arising from withdrawal) to amend the Government of Wales Act 2006.
  • This amendment would limit the power available to a devolved authority to prevent or remedy a breach of international obligations in such a way that it can only make provision that is essential to that end.
  • This amendment would limit the power available to a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority to prevent or remedy a breach of international obligations in such a way that they could only make provision that is essential to that end.
  • This amendment would ensure that the restriction in this paragraph could not be undermined by the use of legislation which does not amend the text of the Human Rights Act but modifies its effect.
  • This amendment would broaden the restriction in this subsection to protect all legislation relating to equality and human rights (and not only the Human Rights Act 1998).
  • This amendment would prevent the Welsh Ministers from using powers proposed in the Bill (to comply with international obligations) to amend the Government of Wales Act 2006.
  • This amendment would provide that the power of Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 2 of Schedule 2 includes the power to confer a power to legislate, aligning those Ministers’ powers to the power of a Minister of the Crown under Clause 8.
  • This amendment would restrict the use of the delegated powers granted to Ministers in Clause 8 to a period of 12 months after 29 March 2019.
  • This amendment is intended to remove the proposed restriction in the Bill on devolved authorities modifying retained direct EU legislation etc.
  • This amendment would provide that the power of the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 2 of Schedule 2 extends to amending directly applicable EU law incorporated into UK law. This brings the power into line with the Minister of the Crown power in Clause 8.
  • This amendment would replace the requirement for a Minister of the Crown to consent to
  • This is a consequential amendment linked to amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3.
  • This is a consequential amendment linked to amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3.
  • This is a consequential amendment linked to amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3.
  • This consequential amendment, linked to amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3, changes the reference to section 80 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 to make clear that the restriction on the powers of the Welsh Ministers not to act or legislate incompatibly with EU law is removed.
  • This amendment would limit the power available to a devolved authority to implement the withdrawal agreement in such a way that it could only make provision that is essential to that end.
  • This amendment would limit the power available to a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority to implement the withdrawal agreement in such a way that they could only make provision that is essential to that end.
  • This amendment would ensure that the restriction in this paragraph could not be undermined by the use of legislation which does not amend the text of the Human Rights Act but modifies its effect.
  • This amendment would broaden the restriction in this subsection to protect all legislation relating to equality and human rights (and not only the Human Rights Act 1998).
  • This amendment would prevent the Welsh Ministers from using powers proposed in the Bill (to implement the withdrawal agreement) to amend the Government of Wales Act 2006.
  • This amendment would include the power to confer a power to legislate among the powers of the Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 3 of Schedule 2, in line with a Minister of the Crown’s powers under Clause 9.
  • This amendment would provide that the power of the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 3 of Schedule 2 extends to amending directly applicable EU law incorporated into UK law, in line with the Minister of the Crown power in Clause 9.
  • This amendment would provide that the power of the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers to make regulations under Part 3 of Schedule 2 includes the power to confer functions which correspond to functions to make EU tertiary legislation.
  • This amendment replaces the requirement for Minister of the Crown consent to regulations made by the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers to implement the withdrawal agreement if they relate to quota arrangements, with a requirement for the Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers to consult with a Minister of the Crown before making the relevant regulations.
  • This amendment would provide a power to the Welsh Ministers to make consequential and transitional provision within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers.
  • This new clause would ensure that the financial provision made in section 12 of this Act does not allow the Government to make a payment in settlement of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union as part of a withdrawal agreement or new Treaty unless it has been expressly approved by the House of Commons.
  • This amendment would ensure that there is a vote in the House of Commons to approve any settlement payment agreed by Ministers as a consequence of negotiations on a withdrawal agreement or new Treaty with the European Union.
  • This amendment would limit the scope of regulations modifying the levying of fees or charges by regulatory bodies to only the effects set out in sub-sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and ©.
  • This amendment would remove the power of public authorities to levy fees or charges via tertiary legislation.
  • This amendment would prevent delegated powers from being used to levy taxes.
  • This amendment would prevent Ministers using the power for public bodies to alter fees and
  • This new clause would require the Government to commission an Independent Report into the constitutional implications of the wide-ranging powers to make regulations delegated to Ministers in Clause 7 of the Bill, in pursuance of the conclusions of the 3rd Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution session 2017–19 (HL Paper 19) “European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: interim report”
  • The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the powers to create secondary legislation given to Ministers by the Bill can be used only in pursuit of the overall statutory purpose, namely to allow retained EU law to continue to operate effectively after exit day.
  • This new clause requires the Government to establish new domestic governance proposals following the UK’s exit from the EU and to ensure statutory and institutional basis for future environmental protection.
  • This new clause would require the Government to produce a list of regulations it intends to make under the Bills correcting powers, and to update that list each month, in order to provide clarity about when, and in which areas, it believes the power will be necessary.
  • This new clause would ensure that the institutions and agencies that protect EU derived rights and protections are replaced to a sufficient standard so those rights and protections will still be enjoyed in practice.
  • This new clause is intended to provide for refugee family reunion in the UK in place of the family reunion aspects of the Dublin III Regulation, allowing adult refugees in the UK to sponsor relatives who are unaccompanied children to come to the UK from around the world.
  • This new clause would require Ministers of the Crown to make specific provision for the enforcement of EU legislation relating to environmental protection.
  • This new clause would require the Government to establish new domestic governance arrangements following the UK’s exit from the EU for environmental standards and protections, following consultation.
  • This Amendment would reduce the wide discretion for using delegated legislation and limit it to those aspects which are unavoidable.
  • This amendment would place a general provision on the face of the Bill to the effect that the delegated powers granted by the Bill should be used only so far as necessary.
  • This Amendment is intended to preserve after exit day the rights, including residence rights, of EU citizens in the UK.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to define in regulations one of the criteria for the use of Clause 7 powers to deal with deficiencies arising from withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would prevent a Minister of the Crown from making provision to deal with deficiencies in retained EU law arising from withdrawal to the extent that the provision would be within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers.
  • To restrict the power of a Minister to make regulations to amend retained EU law to cases where the EU law is deficient in the way set out in the Bill.
  • This amendment would remove the ambiguity in Clause 7 which sets out a definition of ‘deficiencies in retained EU law’ but allows Ministers significant latitude. By removing the qualifying phrase ‘but are not limited to’, subsection (2) becomes a more precise prescribed set of circumstances where Ministers may and may not make regulations.
  • This amendment would ensure that any regulatory or rule-making powers transferred from EU entities to UK public bodies receive the same degree of scrutiny that would have been the case if the UK had remained in the European Union.
  • The amendment would make clear that retained EU law cannot be modified under clause 7 to restrict the rights of EU nationals or businesses in the UK simply because UK nationals or businesses may lose equivalent rights in the EU as a result of the UK’s withdrawal.
  • This amendment would remove the scope for regulations to make provisions that could be made by an Act of Parliament.
  • This amendment would remove the proposed capacity of Ministers under Clause 7 to modify and amend the Act itself via delegated powers.
  • This amendment ensures that the Government cannot establish new agencies using delegated legislation.
  • This amendment would remove the ability of Ministers to replace or abolish public service functions currently undertaken by EU entities without making an alternative provision for those equivalent public services to continue domestically after exit day. Retaining the existing functions undertaken by the EU is an important principle that the part of this sub-clause could potentially undermine.
  • To prevent the abolition by SI of a function currently carried out by an EU entity in the UK, as opposed to its replacement or modification.
  • This amendment seeks to prevent the establishment of new public bodies by means of secondary legislation only, as opposed to primary legislation.
  • This amendment replicates the provisions in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which limit Ministers’ powers even in a time of declared emergency. They ensure that statutory instruments are proportionate and necessary.
  • This amendment is intended to prevent the regulation-making power from being used to remove necessary protections.
  • This amendment provides for any new public authority established under secondary legislation to be temporary.
  • This amendment would ensure that standards, rights and protections currently maintained by EU entities or public authorities in member states will continue to be maintained in practice following the UK’s exit from the EU.
  • This amendment is intended to prevent the regulation-making powers being used to create barriers to the UK’s continued membership of the customs union.
  • This amendment is intended to prevent the regulation-making powers being used to create barriers to the UK’s continued membership of the single market.
  • This amendment prevents Ministers of the Crown from making regulations under the powers in Clause 7 that apply to Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland other than in relation to reserved (or, in the case of Northern Ireland, excepted and reserved) matters.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government from using powers in the Act to remove any consumer protections or rights enshrined in EU law after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union.
  • This amendment would prevent a Minister from using regulations under Clause 7 of the Bill to remove or reduce rights under the Dublin Regulation, the 2004 Directive on freedom of movement, or to remove rights or obligations under TFEU, TEU or the Charter of Fundamental Rights, regarding admission or transfer to the UK of unaccompanied child refugees or asylum seekers (including those who wish to claim asylum).
  • This amendment would ensure that any new institutions required to enforce environmental standards and protections following the UK’s exit from the EU can be created only by primary legislation.
  • This amendment would prevent regulations under the Bill being used to amend the Equality Act 2010.
  • This amendment would ensure that the restriction in this paragraph could not be undermined by the use of legislation which does not amend the text of the Human Rights Act but modifies its effect.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers of a Minister of the Crown under Clause 7 of the Bill to fix problems in retained EU law from being exercised to amend the Scotland Act 1998 or the Government of Wales Act 2006.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government of Wales Act 2006 from being amended by regulations under Clause 7.
  • This amendment would broaden the restriction in this subsection to protect all legislation relating to equality and human rights (and not only the Human Rights Act 1998).
  • This amendment is intended to ensure that the EU Withdrawal Bill does not affect any legislation derived from the Good Friday Agreement or the intention of the Good Friday Agreement.
  • To narrow down the circumstances in which this power can be exercised.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government’s using delegated powers under Clause 7 to reduce rights or protections.
  • This Amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 7 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.
  • This amendment seeks to prevent the delegated powers granted to Ministers by Clause 7 being used to weaken or abolish existing EU-derived legal rights, such as those on workers’ rights, equality, and environmental protection.
  • This amendment would seek to bar Ministers from making regulations under Clause 7 which are not compliant with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
  • This amendment would require that changes cannot be made under Clause 7 to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning the co-ordination of social security systems between the UK and EU member states unless the Secretary of State has consulted with the relevant Minister in each of the devolved administrations.
  • This amendment would require that changes cannot be made under Clause 7 to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning eligibility for UK pensions unless a public consultation on these changes has taken place.
  • This amendment would ensure that the power to make regulations on agricultural policy under Clause 7 could not be exercised without agreement from the Joint Ministerial Council.
  • This amendment would ensure that the power to make regulations concerning fisheries under Clause 7 could not be exercised without agreement from the Joint Ministerial Council.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 7 being used to amend Equality Act 2010 legislation.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 7 being used to remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 7 being used to make provision which could pose a threat to national security.
  • This amendment holds Ministers to the animal welfare standards enshrined in Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
  • This amendment ensures that regulations under this section cannot interfere with environmental protection under retained EU law, by requiring a Ministerial certificate.
  • The amendment would require early consultation with representatives of the financial and professional services industries on relevant modifications which are to be made under clause 7.
  • This amendment is intended to require the Government to make regulations that continue to recognise European Protection Orders issued by courts in other EU member states after exit day.
  • This amendment prevents Ministers of the Crown from being able to replace, abolish or modify the functions of EU Agencies without laying impact assessments on its effect before both Houses of Parliament.
  • This amendment would require a Minister of the Crown to first seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers before making any regulations under Clause 7 on Scottish or Welsh devolved matters.
  • This amendment would ensure that the UK maintains existing air quality standards and protections following the UK’s exit from the EU.
  • This new clause is linked to the removal of Clause 9 and paragraph 6 of Schedule 7 to require the
  • This new clause would ensure that a separate Act of Parliament would be required for Ministers to determine exit day and to set out the arrangements that will apply after exit day.
  • This new clause would ensure that the wide-ranging powers for Ministers to implement the withdrawal agreement set out in Clause 9 of the Bill cannot come into force until the withdrawal agreement has been published.
  • This new clause describes the requirement for each House of Parliament to agree to withdrawal from the European Economic Area and is linked to Amendment 128 which makes the exercise of the power to make regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement contingent on such agreement.
  • This new clause is intended to establish that Parliament has a meaningful vote on the terms of Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union.
  • This new clause would require the Government to seek Parliamentary approval for its exit agreement with the EU at least three months before exit day.
  • The intention of this new clause, which could be amended only by primary legislation, is to specify the actions that should be taken if the Government does not secure a withdrawal agreement by 31 Oct 2018 or that Parliament does not approve a withdrawal agreement by 28 February 2019.
  • This new clause is intended to ensure that primary legislation is used to implement the withdrawal agreement, including maintaining EU citizens’ rights.
  • To require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by Parliament.
  • This amendment would require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by both Parliament and by the devolved administrations.
  • This amendment would prevent a Minister of the Crown from making provision to implement the withdrawal agreement to the extent that the provision would be within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers.
  • This amendment seeks to restrict the delegated powers granted to Ministers by Clause 9.
  • This removes the power of Ministers to amend this Act, the Parliament Acts and any Act granted assent in this session of Parliament. It is necessary so as to safeguard the constitutional provisions in the Parliament Acts, such as the provision that a Parliament cannot last more than five years and the relative powers of the House of Lords.
  • This amendment would remove the proposed capacity of Ministers in Clause 9 to modify and amend the Act itself via delegated powers.
  • This amendment would prevent the Ministerial order making powers in Clause 9 being used to modify the European Union (Withdrawal) Act itself.
  • The amendment would make clear that aspects of EU membership, such as the automatic effect of EU law and enforcement and adjudication mechanisms, can be maintained for an implementation period if the Government agrees to do so as part of the withdrawal agreement.
  • This amendment is intended to maintain the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement after the UK leaves the EU.
  • This amendment is preparatory to Amendment 370.
  • This amendment would ensure that the restriction in this paragraph could not be undermined by the use of legislation which does not amend the text of the Human Rights Act but modifies its effect.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government’s using delegated powers under Clause 9 to reduce rights or protections.
  • This Amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 8 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.
  • This amendment seeks to prevent the delegated powers granted to Ministers by Clause 9 being used to weaken or abolish existing EU-derived legal rights, such as those on workers’ rights, equality, and environmental protection.
  • This amendment seeks to protect the existing rights of EU citizens living in the UK.
  • This amendment would seek to bar Ministers from making regulations under Clause 9 which are not compliant with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 9 being used to amend Equality Act 2010 legislation.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 9 being used to remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 9 being used to make provision which could pose a threat to national security.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government of Wales Act 2006 from being amended by regulations under Clause 9.
  • This amendment would broaden the restriction in this subsection to protect all legislation relating to equality and human rights (and not only the Human Rights Act 1998).
  • This amendment makes the exercise of the power to make regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement contingent on the requirement for separate agreement on withdrawal from the European Economic Area of NC29.
  • This amendment would prevent a Minister of the Crown from using the power to make regulations under Clause 9 implementing any withdrawal agreement to change the devolution settlements for Scotland and Wales without the consent of the Scottish Ministers or Welsh Ministers.
  • This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom exiting the EU single market on the UK public finances, before any regulations are made under section 9.
  • This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom exiting the EU single market on the levels of GDP growth in the UK and in each part of the UK, before any regulations are made under section 9.
  • This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom ending freedom of movement on the UK’s public finances, before any regulations are made under section 9.
  • This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the broadened responsibilities of the UK Treasury following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, before any regulations are made under section 9.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government using any delegated powers under Clause 9 until it had secured Parliamentary approval for its proposals to replace any provisions that cease to apply as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of Euratom.
  • This amendment would ensure that powers to Ministers to make regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement cannot be exercised until such time as the withdrawal agreement has been published along with the publication of associated legislative proposals on customs, trade, immigration, fisheries, agriculture, nuclear safeguards and international sanctions.
  • Although the power conferred by this clause lapses on exit day, there is no sunset clause for the statutory instruments provided under it. This would make all such statutory instruments lapse two years after exit day and require the Government to introduce primary legislation if it wanted to keep them in force.
  • This amendment seeks to ensure that Ministers cannot make and use secondary legislation for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement until such time as that agreement has been approved by a Ratification Referendum.
  • This amendment seeks to protect the existing rights of both EU citizens living in the UK, and UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU.
  • This amendment would require a Minister of the Crown to first seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers before making any regulations under Clause 9 on Scottish or Welsh devolved matters.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy to retain access to the EU’s Emissions Trading System markets after withdrawal.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for the UK to continue participation in the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative after withdrawal from the EU.”
  • This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for retaining access to the European Investment Bank.
  • This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for retaining access to the European Investment Fund.
  • This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Food Safety Authority.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy for seeking to ensure that reciprocal healthcare arrangements continue after the UK leaves the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Medicines Agency.
  • This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work.
  • This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Chemicals Agency.
  • This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Single Sky Agreement.
  • This amendment would require the Government to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continues to be a member of the European Aviation Safety Agency after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continues to be a member of the European Maritime Safety Agency after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to be a member of the ERASMUS scheme after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would seek to ensure that roaming charges do not come into effect after exit day for UK citizens in the EU and vice versa.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to be a member of Creative Europe after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the UK to make a request to the President of the European Council for continued UK membership of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to have access to Passenger Name Records after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Schengen Information System after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the European Arrest Warrant after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROPOL after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROJUST after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the European Criminal Records Information system with the EU after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Prüm Council decisions relating to fingerprint and DNA exchange with the EU, after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the False and Authentic Documents Online (“FADO”) internet-based image archiving system after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to participate in the Convention on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between Customs Administrations of 1997 (“Naples II Convention”), after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable British-registered lawyers to continue to appear before the Court of Justice of the European Union, after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to ensure that communications from British-registered lawyers with regard to proceedings before the European Court continue to be covered by legal profession privilege, after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would facilitate the continuance of free movement in and out of Scotland after exit day.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for continued participation by the United Kingdom in the common European Asylum System, after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for a food standards framework after withdrawal from the EU, before making any regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement.
  • This amendment would ensure harmonisation of clinical trials across the EU Member States will continue in the UK after the UK leaves the EU.
  • This amendment would ensure that the withdrawal agreement is implemented through primary legislation.
  • This new clause establishes the principle that there shall be a Commons triage committee which works alongside the Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee to determine the level of scrutiny each statutory instrument shall receive.
  • This new clause would require the Government to bring forward early proposals for the House of Commons to consider as changes to Standing Orders to reflect the scrutiny required as a result of changes to regulation and delegated legislation made by this Act.
  • This new clause would commit Ministers to abiding by the existing Cabinet Office code of practice on consultations in respect of regulations to be made under the Bill.
  • This new Clause would ensure that social, employment and environmental laws cannot be changed by the order-making powers delegated to Ministers without a vote in Parliament.
  • This new clause seeks to ensure that a Parliamentary Committee rather than ministers should decide what is the appropriate level of scrutiny for regulations made under the Act and that the Parliamentary Committee has the power to require enhanced scrutiny in relation to regulations that it considers to be particularly significant or contentious.
  • This amendment would require the Minister to provide an explanatory statement on whether the regulations simply transpose EU law or make further changes, subject to a check by a committee of the House, and require that if the regulations involve more than simple transposition the super affirmative procedure must be used.
  • This amendment would ensure Parliament has following recommendations by the Minister, which parliamentary procedure should be used to scrutinise statutory instruments containing regulations that deal with deficiencies arising from EU withdrawal. It also provides for use of the “super-affirmative resolution procedure” whereby a committee of either House can recommend that no further proceedings be taken in relation to a draft order, which can only be over-turned by a resolution of that House.
  • This amendment is linked to Amendment 21 and removes the provision that certain statutory instruments can be introduced under the negative resolution and requires all SIs made under Clause 7 to go through the affirmative route with a vote in both Houses. It means that the Government could not bypass Parliament by refusing to grant time for a debate on annulling an SI.
  • This amendment is linked to Amendment 20 and removes the provision that certain statutory instruments can be introduced under the negative resolution and requires all SIs made under Clause 7 to go through the affirmative route with a vote in both Houses. It means that the Government could not bypass Parliament by refusing to grant time for a debate on annulling an SI.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 34 and 35 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 7 of this Act, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 33 and 35 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 7 of this Act, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This amendment would make any changes to the application of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive in the UK subject to approval by resolution of each House of Parliament.
  • This amendment would require that the rights of workers currently afforded by EU law that are being transposed into UK law can be changed only through affirmative procedure.
  • This amendment would require that the rights of disabled people currently afforded by EU law that are being transposed into UK law can be changed only through affirmative procedure.
  • This amendment would list areas regarding workers’ rights where changes to EU-derived law could be made only through affirmative procedure.
  • This amendment, linked to Amendment 264, would ensure that any regulations to define “failure to operate efficiently” under section 7(1A) would be subject to affirmative procedure.
  • To set up a triage and scrutiny system under the control of Parliament for determining how Statutory Instruments under Clause 7 of the Bill will be dealt with.
  • This amendment would facilitate the use of affirmative and super-affirmative procedures, other than for the transfer of functions of EU public bodies.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 33 and 34 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 7 of this Act, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This amendment would require regulations appointing an exit day to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
  • This amendment, and Amendments 329 and 331, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
  • This amendment applies the procedures set out in Amendment 129 in respect of the UK Parliament for regulations made jointly by a Minister of the Crown acting jointly with a devolved authority.
  • Consequential amendment to Amendment 3.
  • This amendment, and Amendments 328 and 331, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
  • This amendment would require that, when using the urgent cases provision in the Bill, the Minister must first consult with businesses and other relevant organisations.
  • This amendment would limit the circumstances in which Ministers can use procedures for urgent cases to circumstances in which there is a serious threat of damage to human welfare, the environment or the security of the United Kingdom.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 37 and 38 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 8 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 36 and 38 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 8 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This would mean that if the Leader of the Opposition or 80 members of the House of Commons were to sign a prayer against an SI that was subject under Schedule 7 to the negative procedure, the Government would have to provide time for a debate and a vote on the floor of the House or lose the SI. At present there is no such provision in the House of Commons.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 36 and 37 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 8 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This amendment is linked to New Clause 3 to require the Government to implement the withdrawal agreement through separate primary and secondary legislation rather than through this Bill.
  • This amendment is linked to Amendment 24 and removes the provision that certain statutory instruments can be introduced under the negative resolution and requires all SIs under Clause 9 to go through the affirmative route with a vote in both Houses. It means that the Government could not bypass Parliament by refusing to grant time for a debate on annulling an SI.
  • This amendment is linked to Amendment 23 and removes the provision that certain statutory instruments can be introduced under the negative resolution and requires all SIs under Clause 9 to go through the affirmative route with a vote in both Houses. It means that the Government could not bypass Parliament by refusing to grant time for a debate on annulling an SI.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 40 and 41 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 9 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 39 and 41 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 9 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 39 and 40 would establish that it is for Parliament to decide which level of scrutiny a Statutory Instrument shall receive under Clause 9 of this Bill, and that matters of policy interest will be subject to the approval of both Houses and to amendment.
  • This amendment provides for draft affirmative resolution scrutiny for the power to the definition of “law relating to equality or human rights”, inserted by Amendment 371.
  • Consequential to amendment 293.
  • Consequential to amendment 293.
  • The intention of this amendment is that tertiary legislation under the Act should be subject to the same parliamentary control and time-limits as are applicable to secondary legislation.
  • This amendment would remove the wider latitude currently allowing Ministers to make regulations without Parliamentary approval “by reason of urgency” and instead only allow such executive action “by reason of emergency”. An emergency is a situation that poses an immediate risk to human health, life, property, or environment.
  • This amendment would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
  • The intention of this amendment is to provide for a citizens’ jury to be consulted before regulations are made under this Act.
  • This amendment would require consultation and an impact assessment before legislation affecting the relating to the oil and gas sector is changed by regulations made under the Act.
  • This amendment, and Amendments 328 and 329, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
  • This amendment would remove a widely drawn delegated power, which covers anything that happens as a consequence of the Act.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government of Wales Act 2006 from being amended by regulations under Clause 17.
  • This amendment is consequential on amendment 381 and highlights that transitional, transitory or saving provision under the Bill may relate to exit day.
  • This amendment would prevent a Minister of the Crown from making transitional, transitory or saving provision to the extent that the provision would be within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers.
  • This amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 17 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.
  • This amendment imposes the same restriction on the regulation making powers under Clause 17 as applies to other regulation powers in the Bill.
  • This amendment would place restrictions on the power to make consequential and transitional provision.
  • This amendment would replicate, for the powers in clause 17, the equality and human rights restrictions on other powers in this Bill (as modified by other amendments).
  • This amendment would remove the powers granted to Ministers by Clause 17, including the power to amend provisions in this Bill, once enacted, by means of delegated legislation only.
  • This new clause would require Ministers to publish a full list and assessment of the implications of this Act on the many international treaties and agreements that the United Kingdom is party to and which may be impacted as a result of this Bill. The assessment would also have to set out those areas where Ministers anticipate the powers in Clause 8 of this Bill may need to be used.
  • This new clause would require Ministers and public authorities, from exit day onwards, to act in such a way as to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the optional protocols to which the UK is a signatory state.
  • This new clause would require Ministers and public authorities, from exit day onwards, to act in such a way as to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the optional protocols to which the UK is a signatory state.
  • This amendment is intended to maintain the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement after the UK leaves the EU.
  • This amendment would allow Ministers to make regulations to fulfil obligations arising out of the British-Irish Agreement (which commits to implementation of the Multi-Party Agreement).
  • This amendment would prevent a Minister of the Crown from making provision to prevent or remedy any breach of international obligations to the extent that the provision would be within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers.
  • This amendment seeks to restrict the delegated powers granted to Ministers by Clause 8.
  • This amendment would remove the proposed capacity of Ministers in Clause 8 to modify and amend the Act itself via delegated powers.
  • This amendment is intended to ensure that the UK continues to meet international air quality standards after withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment is intended to maintain the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement after the UK leaves the EU.
  • This amendment is preparatory to Amendment 367.
  • This amendment would ensure that the restriction in this paragraph could not be undermined by the use of legislation which does not amend the text of the Human Rights Act but modifies its effect.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers of a Minister of the Crown under Clause 8 of the Bill to ensure compliance with international obligations from being exercised to amend the Scotland Act 1998 or the Government of Wales Act 2006.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government of Wales Act 2006 from being amended by regulations under Clause 8.
  • This amendment would prevent the Government’s using delegated powers under Clause 8 to reduce rights or protections.
  • This Amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 8 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.
  • This amendment seeks to prevent the delegated powers granted to Ministers by clause 8 being used to weaken or abolish existing EU-derived legal rights, such as those on workers’ rights, equality, and environmental protection.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 8 being used to amend Equality Act 2010 legislation.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 8 being used to remove, reduce or otherwise limit the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK.
  • This amendment would prevent the powers in Clause 8 being used to make provision which could pose a threat to national security.
  • This amendment would prevent the imposition or increase of a tax by regulations made under Clause 8 to comply with international obligations.
  • This amendment is intended to ensure that the power to make regulations to fulfil obligations arising out of the British-Irish Agreement could not be used in a manner incompatible with those obligations.
  • This amendment would broaden the restriction in this subsection to protect all legislation relating to equality and human rights (and not only the Human Rights Act 1998).
  • This amendment would restrict the use of the delegated powers granted to Ministers in clause 8 to a period of 12 months after 29 March 2019.
  • This amendment would require a Minister of the Crown to first seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers before making any regulations under Clause 8 on Scottish or Welsh devolved matters.
  • This amendment would ensure that in exercising the powers under this provision, the Government maintains equivalent standards to the EU, and in particular, in making trade agreements.
  • This new clause would require Ministers to publish copies of retained direct EU legislation accompanied by ‘plain English’ and readily understandable summarising explanatory documents.
  • This amendment would require the Government to publish its economic impact assessments of the policy options for withdrawal from the EU.
  • This new clause would ensure that Parliament has ratified successor arrangements for a future relationship and Treaty between the EU and UK before ‘exit day’ can be appointed by Ministers.
  • This new clause would ensure that provisions allowing the UK to remain a member of the Customs Union, as currently set out in section 5 of the European Communities Act 1972 but set to be repealed by section 1 of this Act, will be enacted ahead of exit day.
  • This amendment removes the power for a Minister of the Crown to appoint exit day by regulations and ensures that exit day is fixed at 29 March 2019 at 11.00 p.m. for all purposes.
  • This amendment would require ‘exit day’ to be specified, for all purposes, in a separate bill seeking approval for the final terms of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. It would therefore have the effect of requiring a statute on the withdrawal terms — whatever they might be — to be passed by Parliament before ‘exit day’.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 44 and 45 would empower Parliament to control the length and basic terms of transitional arrangements, and would allow Parliament to start the clock on the sunset clauses within the Bill.
  • To prevent the creation of different exit days for different parts of the Act by SI.
  • This amendment defines “law relating to equality or human rights” for the purposes of other amendments which would broaden protection provided by the Bill from interference with the Human Rights Act to include other provisions about human rights and equality.
  • This amendment provides a definition of pending cases for the purposes of Clause 6.
  • This amendment would prevent Ministers using delegated powers to create criminal offences which carry custodial sentences.
  • This amendment is consequential on amendment 381 and ensures that references to exit day in the Bill and other legislation operate correctly in relation to the time as well as the date of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment is consequential on Amendment 386 and ensures that references to exit day in the Bill and other legislation operate correctly in relation to the time as well as the date of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 43 and 45 would empower Parliament to control the length and basic terms of transitional arrangements, and would allow Parliament to start the clock on the sunset clauses within the Bill.
  • This amendment together with Amendments 43 and 44 would empower Parliament to control the length and basic terms of transitional arrangements, and would allow Parliament to start the clock on the sunset clauses within the Bill.
  • This amendment would allow Ministers to amend the definition of “law relating to equality or human rights” inserted by Amendment 371.
  • This new clause would ensure that the current consultative role that UK local government currently have via the EU Committee of the Regions would be replicated in the UK after exit day.
  • This new Clause would ensure that the UK can remain a member of the European Economic Area until such time as Ministers publish a specific assessment in the form of a White Paper setting out the costs and benefits for the UK of remaining a member after exit day.
  • This new Clause would require the UK Government to seek transitional arrangements that would allow existing trade agreements which currently apply to the UK to be negotiated and continued for the circumstances applying after the UK has exited the EU, and would seek transitional arrangements including an associate membership of the EU Single Market for not less than two years following exit day.
  • After exit day the European Union is likely to continue to produce legislation, regulations and decisions that would have applied to the United Kingdom if we had remained a member of the EU. This new clause would require Ministers to publish an assessment of new and developing EU laws and regulations and whether there would be benefits or costs for the UK in adopting similar legal changes to UK domestic legislation with a view to maintaining regulatory alignment with the EU as far as possible.
  • This new clause ensures that public authorities carrying out their duties arising by virtue of this act, must have regard to environmental principles currently enshrined in EU law.
  • This new clause would require the Government to lay before Parliament a strategy for maintaining co-operation with certain EU bodies and structures after exit day for the purposes of promoting the safety and welfare of children and young people.
  • This new clause seeks to maintain financial support after exit day for projects and programmes which would have been eligible for funding from the European Social Fund.
  • This new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a strategy for mitigating any potential risks which withdrawal from the EU might present to low income families with children.
  • This new clause would require an independent evaluation of the impact of the Act upon the health and social care sector to be made after consulting the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the relevant Northern Ireland department, service providers, those requiring health and social care services, and others.
  • This new clause would require the Secretary of State to carry out a public consultation within six months of the passing of the Act, assessing the impact of not having an EU withdrawal deal on workers in the EU who are UK citizens, and on workers in the UK who are EU citizens.
  • This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish within six months of the passing of this Act an assessment of the impact of leaving the EU on social and medical care provision for disabled people living in the UK.
  • This new clause would require the UK Government to seek to maintain existing mutual recognition agreements and to publish a plan for UK notified bodies (such as the British Standards Institute) to continue to perform conformity assessments for medical devices and pubic health-related products deriving both within the UK and from across the EU.
  • This new clause would ensure that the objectives set out by the Prime Minister in her Florence speech are given the force of law and, if no implementation and transition period is achieved in negotiations, then exit day may not be triggered by a Minister of the Crown. The appointment of an ‘exit day’ would therefore require a fresh Act of Parliament in such circumstances.
  • The purpose of this new clause is to ensure that the Bill does not remove or prejudice rights (for instance in the financial services field) which, as a result of the UK’s (and Gibraltar’s) common
  • This new clause would (a) commit the Government to seeking to replicate in the withdrawal agreement the framework for mutual recognition of professional qualifications the UK has at present and (b) allow competent UK authorities to continue to recognise EU qualifications as equivalent to their UK counterparts.
  • This new clause would ensure that after withdrawal from the EU, the UK continued to participate in the Regulation for the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals.
  • This new clause would require a Minister to report before exit day on the Government’s progress in negotiating mutual market access for financial and professional services
  • This new clause would require a Minister to report before exit day on the Government’s progress in negotiating mutual recognition of controls on food and feed imports. It would also require the Government to permit, so far as possible, full cost recovery for authorities carrying out border inspections of food or feed.
  • This new clause would ensure that legislation in connection with withdrawal from the EU does not reduce protections provided by equality law.
  • This new clause calls for the Government to lay a report before Parliament laying out how cross-
  • The amendment would make clear that the Bill does not modify the interpretation of contracts relating to EU law.
  • This amendment would remove the additional power provided in paragraph 3.
  • This amendment and Amendment 190 are in consequence of Amendment 165 as no restriction relating to retained EU law on the making of subordinate legislation by the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers would apply.
  • This amendment would remove the future powers to make subordinate legislation in paragraph 5.
  • This amendment and Amendment 189 are in consequence of Amendment 165 to Schedule 3 as no restriction relating to retained EU law on the making of subordinate legislation by the Scottish Ministers and the Welsh Ministers will apply.
  • This amendment would retain the provisions of the European Economic Area Act 1993 as part of domestic legislation beyond exit day.
  • This amendment would amend the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 on the right of the Advocate General to take part in proceedings in consequence of removing the restriction on the competence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government by Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3.
  • This amendment would amend the status of EU-derived domestic legislation to subordinate legislation for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998.
  • This amendment would remove the proposal to allow secondary legislation to be treated as primary for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998.
  • This amendment, together with Amendments 139 and 141, would restore the right to obtain damages after exit day in respect of governmental failures before exit day to comply with European Union obligations.
  • This amendment, together with Amendments 139 and 140, would restore the right to obtain damages after exit day in respect of governmental failures before exit day to comply with European Union obligations.
  • This amendment would require all tertiary legislation made under powers conferred by regulations to be subject to Parliamentary control.
  • This amendment, with Amendments 193, 194 and 195, is in consequence of Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3 which would remove the powers to make an Order in Council to adjust the new restriction on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales.
  • This amendment, with Amendments 192, 194 and 195, is in consequence of Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3 which would remove the powers to make an Order in Council to adjust the new restriction on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales.
  • This amendment, with Amendments 192, 193 and 195, is in consequence of Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3 which would remove the powers to make an Order in Council to adjust the new restriction on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales.
  • This amendment, with Amendments 192, 193 and 194, is in consequence of Amendments 164 and 165 to Clause 11 and Schedule 3 which would remove the powers to make an Order in Council to adjust the new restriction on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales.
  • This amendment is a consequential amendment resulting from Amendments 78, 79 and 80 to Clause 1 requiring the Prime Minister to reach an agreement on EEA and Customs Union membership, to gain the consent of the devolved legislatures and to report on the effect leaving the EU will have on the block grant before implementing section 1 of this Act.
  • This amendment is intended to ensure that before March 2019 (or the end of any extension to the two-year negotiation period) a referendum on the terms of the deal has to be held and provides the text of the referendum question.
  • This amendment is a consequential amendment resulting from Amendments 78, 79 and 80 to Clause 1 requiring the Prime Minister to reach an agreement on EEA and Customs Union membership, gain the consent of the devolved legislatures and report on the effect leaving the EU will have on the block grant before implementing section 1 of this Act.
  • This amendment would make the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 on exit day conditional on the Prime Minister reaching an agreement for the United Kingdom to remain a member of the EEA and Customs Union.
  • This amendment makes the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 on exit day conditional on the Prime Minister gaining consent from the devolved legislatures.
  • This amendment would require the UK Government to lay a report before the National Assembly for Wales outlining the effect of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on Welsh finances, before exercising the power under section 1. This would allow for scrutiny of the Leave Campaign’s promise to maintain current levels of EU funding for Wales.
  • This amendment would require the UK Government to lay a report before Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales outlining the effect of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU Single Market and Customs Union before exercising the powers in section 1.
  • This amendment would require publication of a Government report on which Scottish products will be identified with geographical indications in any future trade deal that Her Majesty’s Government negotiates after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union.
  • This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on Scottish businesses.
  • This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on food and drink safety and quality standards.

Think of a number


The UK is currently deadlocked on talks with the EU over how to not have a border on the island of Ireland (no idea) how to settle citizens rights (stop being a dick about it) and the question of money — lets talk about that last one.

The EU wants us to agree to the principle that financial commitments made as 28 will be paid as 28. That means we need to go through the very big list of things that we have committed to funding in the UK and around the EU27 including loans and pensions and all that jazz. We could do that, but our side don’t want to bother. They would rather throw out random numbers and say “we would never pay €100bn” or “we could maybe pay €20bn”. It is all rather silly, we shouldn’t be starting with guessing at acceptable numbers but doing the work to come up with a correct number. Nevertheless, we are where we are, in negotiations with our side being a bunch of workshy layabouts who don’t want to engage with the problem or even turn up to do the job.

There might be an alternative approach to this, let me take you back in time to 27th March 1972 (image swirls, we are all now dressed like Austin Powers — yeah baby) and we can take a look at the accession treaty that took the UK into the EU, specifically Article 130 — the financial on-ramp that meant we were not paying in full for commitments jointly made prior to our accession.

The Communities’ own resources and also the financial contributions and, where appropriate, the contributions referred to in Article 4(2), ( 3 ) and (4) of the Decision of 21 April 1970 shall be due from the new Member States to the following extent only :

45.0% in 1973
56.0% in 1974
67.5% in 1975
79.5% in 1976
92.0% in 1977.

So there we have it, our contributions to the EU built up over 5 years as we joined. If the Tories are going to continue to be workshy layabouts then lets think of a number that makes sense. If we take our current contribution to the EU budget of around £13.1bn and then pay that over 5 years with a mirroring off-ramp, so 92% of it in the year after Brexit down to 45% in 2025 then that sum would be £44.54bn. It is in the ballpark of the figures that have been discussed, it is arguable that it is fair, it is affordable, it is decreasing, it has some justification. Lets sling it out there, and see if that is enough to allow the disgraced former defence secretary Liam Fox to get on with some trade deals.

Musings on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

On 29th March 2019 a large chunk of the law that we have to follow in the UK will vanish. The treaties of the EU (TEU and TFEU) will no longer apply to the UK and the European Communities Act 1972 will be repealed (or will be rendered obsolete) and a heap of EU stuff will not apply in the UK. We will stop being a member state of the union.

Firstly lets spend a moment to understand what exactly all that stuff is. The EU makes law in two main ways, Directives and Regulations. Directives are orders to the 28 member states to achieve a goal but they don’t specify how to do it. Take a look for example at 2006/40/EC relating to emissions from air-conditioning systems in motor vehicles. The key bit is article 10 “Member States shall adopt and publish by 4 January 2008 the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive.” so for these things, the member states pass domestic laws. In our case, we passed (amongst other things probably) “The Motor Vehicles (Refilling of Air Conditioning Systems by Service Providers) Regulations 2009” which is a statutory instrument (an SI is a little law that the government doesn’t want to bother parliament with too much, so they leave it on the desk in the Commons for a few weeks in case anyone wants to read it, then it becomes law automatically). So, in the case of this directive we already have the UK law we need, and that law will still be UK law after Brexit.

Next up is regulations. These are EU laws that don’t require domestic implementation. These are the things that freak out the quitters, EU laws made in Brussels (and passed by the democratically elected MEPs) that have direct applicability in the UK without the UK parliament being involved in the process. These don’t do anything particularly scary, they can’t create criminal offences, but they can have an impact on various areas of safety, trade, product design and life in general. Regulations end with the phrase “This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.”

Lets have a look at a recent regulation. 2017/1369 (go and skim read it now, I will wait) is a regulation on labelling products with energy efficiency ratings. Thanks to earlier efforts in this area products are becoming much more efficient, so now many things are A rated on that familiar scale from A to G (or A+++ to D sometimes) that you get stuck on appliances like washing machines etc. In response to this progress they now want to raise the bar and re-scale the thresholds so that consumers can differentiate between the new more efficient products. There is going to be a bit of a redesign of the label and the criteria get tougher. Innocuous stuff really.

The Withdrawal bill (explanatory notes and Commons Library research paper) will take all direct regulations and copy the text of them into UK law. It will then give the government sweeping powers to fix those regulations to make them work in a UK context. This means that 2017/1369 is going to be scooped up and posted to legislation.gov.uk in verbatim form on Brexit day. Then they will “fix” it. What does that mean exactly? Well, the end result we want is pretty clear. We want it to be UK law that Currys will flog washing machines with the right energy labels on them, the same as you get if you walk into Darty. Maybe at some point we will have our own scheme like the Australian labels which would no doubt be a bold thrusting expression of our independence and sovereignty. Does scooping up the regulation and calling it UK law do that? Not really! It empowers the commission to set up product databases, it sets up consultation groups, working plans, gives authority for supplementary delegated acts and on the way it does set some obligations for suppliers and dealers to distribute the appropriate ratings with the products. This would make horrific UK law if it became post-Brexit law in the current state. It isn’t something that can be fixed with a quick find and replace, it needs a root and branch re-write. There is nothing special about the example I picked, it is just the latest of 12000 or so they intend to transpose in two years — at a proposed rate of something like 120 a week for two years solid! You will note that there is no worked example of transposing any regulation through the process defined in the bill, and there is no evidence to suggest that a rate of 120/week is achievable and sustainable. There is no obstacle to fixing up a small random sample of regulations and a back of the envelope calculation would reveal whether the job fits in the time available.

Our law lasts a long time, this post-Brexit law making rush is going to have to set the UK up for centuries to come. The current Withdrawal act plan is going to set in stone a lot of very very badly drafted law.

Don’t bring me problems, bring me solutions!

So, I can moan about this incompetent approach, but that doesn’t help things unless I suggest a different way. I do have one that I think is legally fairly sound (any lawyers want to correct me on that?) and workable. We should pass a law that makes it an offence to take advantage of the lack of regulation post-Brexit. This would create an obligation on everyone to do roughly what would have been done if we were a member state where at all possible.

That would mean that vendors of washing machines would have an obligation to put the appropriate stickers on because that is what they would do if there was a valid regulation in force. It would be an offence to stick A rated stickers on a C rated appliance — not because we have any particular efficiency regulation, but because doing so would be taking advantage of the unregulated situation. This law would persist while the UK passes new red white and blue regulations written from scratch to do whatever parliament wants them to do. I would call it the “Don’t Be a Dick While We Get Our Shit Together Act of 2019” which I think sums up the essence of it in a way that everyone should understand.

This approach does not require any Henry VIII super powers, it does not require an impossible parliamentary workload, it shifts some of the interpretation of what should be done to the courts on a case by case basis until there is settled UK law. It means that we have some semblance of functional law on day 1 rather than a complete mess that becomes live UK law with an intention to patch it up over the following two years before the government super powers expire.

So, how bad is this Henry VIII stuff anyway?

To wrap up my musings, lets just talk about what everyone else is talking about with regards to the Withdrawal Bill — those Henry VIII powers that allow the government to do pretty much anything. I think a sense of perspective is required here, what we have is Jim Hacker requesting lots of power for Sir Humphrey Appleby’s team to do a ridiculous amount of work to unbreak the thousands of EU regulations that they plan to make into post-Brexit acts of UK law. There is no particularly evil intent here, the Sir Humphreys will be writing all the statutory instruments to patch the laws. There will be some minor conniving going on, where they can get away with it, but Sir Humphrey isn’t going to introduce the death penalty (at least not for people who went to a respectable university). We can relax in the knowledge that the Henry VIII powers will just be wielded by unelected pen pushing bureaucrats. It is an interesting side effect of the “take back control” agenda I suppose, but worrying about the power grab seems like a bit of a distraction from the big issue that the job can’t be done, and will create centuries of bad law if it is attempted.

Boris, Sikhism and Booze

Today Boris Johnson embarrassed the country by talking in a Sikh Gurdwara about the whisky tariffs of India, offering the prospect of the 150% tariff being reduced to nothing with a free trade deal. Alcohol is prohibited in Sikhism, but as Boris may have known, this is treated as more of a guideline and in a social setting a wee dram or two might well be considered acceptable refreshment. He should also have known that a Gurdwara was not the place to promote whisky, especially with the phrase “they all like it” and talking about taking “clinkie” in luggage for relatives.

Setting aside the diplomatic faux pas, lets dig a little deeper into the tariff issue. Boris is right that India imposes a 150% tariff on imports of foreign whisky. This is to protect their domestic whisky (which is actually rum) production from imports. The Indian authorities would very much like to export their whisky (which is actually rum) to the EU, but they complain that the EU has rules preventing them from marketing it in the EU as whisky (because it is rum). I wonder if you can guess which member of the EU is the most insistent on the EU maintaining a firm line on this? The point here is that Boris isn’t offering a zero tariff on whisky, he is seeking a zero tariff on whisky. The tariff is paid by Indian importers to the Indian government when they import our whisky. Our producers face the tariff but don’t pay or collect the tariff. They just sell less because the tariff makes them noncompetitive against local whisky (which is rum). We need to offer something to get a trade deal, such as letting them sell rum in the UK labeled as whisky, alongside the Scotch. Did you guess the country yet?

So, do we have import duty on whisky (or rum)? In general no, we don’t. There is no import tariff. There is however alcohol duty. For spirits that is £28.74 per litre of pure alcohol, so a 70cl bottle of Directors Special at 42.8% would attract duty of £8.61 to be paid to HMRC by the importer when it leaves the bonded warehouse at the docks. Boris can’t offer wiggle room on this as part of a trade deal — it isn’t a trade matter, we can’t vary it based on country of origin, it simply isn’t an import tariff, it is an alcohol duty.

There are other things we can offer India as part of a trade deal, it isn’t whisky for whisky, there are other product lines where we could liberalise trade in terms of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, also social liberalisation reducing visa barriers and enhancing freedom of movement would be good things to offer. A deal can happen, however I am not filled with confidence that our foreign secretary even knows the difference between what is being sought and what is being offered.

On the plus side, the foreign office doesn’t negotiate trade, that will be the job of the department for international trade after we exit the EU (until we exit the EU that is the department for doing nothing). Does Liam Fox know the first thing about doing a trade deal? Does he know what he is offering and seeking? One day we may find out.